ATTACKING IRAN: THE CASE SO FAR - July 30, 2008

The case mounts by the week. In June, it was reported that Israeli forces were conducting military exercises for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israeli historian Benny Morris of Ben-Gurion University has suggested in the New York Times that an attack on Iran within the next five to seven months is inevitable. The apocalyptic language of Morris is undeniable; he urges the need for a successful conventional attack on Tehran’s nuclear facilities. In the event that it fails to ‘significantly harm or stall the Iranian program, a ratcheting up of the Iranian-Israeli conflict to a nuclear level will most likely follow.’ November 5 to January 19 is the time given for a likely air strike – between the election and inauguration of the new American president.

Such slippery and dangerous notions (the idea of an ‘existential threat’; the irredeemable nature of Iran’s regime) suggest that the Israel can only see an Iranian nuclear program as directed against itself. Iran is placed beyond the pale of dialogue, yet time and time again countries (call them rogues, undesirables, or states of emergency) are constantly being brought back to the diplomatic table.

Commentators such as Morris (and indeed, most members of the Israeli political spectrum) begin from a position that is hardly tenable: that Iran can never go nuclear. The proposition ceased being tenable the moment the atom was mastered for the making of weapons. ‘The Iranian threat must be stopped by all possible means,’ argued Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in early June. ‘The international community has a duty and responsibility to clarify to Iran, through drastic measures, that the repercussions of their continued pursuit of nuclear weapons will be devastating.’ The argument, presumably, holds for any Arab or Muslim country that may have a capability, potential or otherwise, to strike at Israel.

The language directed not merely against Iran but against the international community on this score demonstrates how divorced Israeli policy is from any stable concept of sovereignty and peace. The world view that unfolds from it is marked by the panic of perpetual emergency. Such emergencies trigger the arguments of necessity, and necessity in terms of state survival seemingly knows no law. The danger with such games is inevitable: regional instability is reassured, and war becomes a panacea for insecurities.

The gap between the EU and Israel on the subject of international law and diplomacy was exemplified by a visit from Dani Yatom, member of the Knesset, to a NATO conference in Brussels in 2007. The former general was baffled when confronted with the meeting agenda: the terms ‘The Iranian Challenge’ rather than ‘The Iranian Threat’ were used. Then we have Morris’ stock standard response. The ‘international community,’ argues Morris, ‘will continue to do nothing effective and that Iran will speed up its efforts to produce the bomb that can destroy Israel.’ Perhaps it is Israel, with Washington’s poorly judged backing, which has left the international community in its wake.

The sole dissenter in the ongoing mania about an assault on Iran within that embattled country is Professor Martin van Creveld of the Hebrew University, who has argued that co-existence between Israel and Iran is possible, despite the presence of nuclear weapons. High rhetoric need not translate into high deadly deeds. Tehran, he points out, would be able to do little harm to Israel, but sizeable harm to trade in the Straits of Hormuz. Tehran’s means to do so is enhanced by various purchases of anti-ship and anti-aircraft hardware from Russia and the Ukraine.

There is a growing momentum at work for a military ‘solution’ to the impasse. In February 2007, Dan Plesch of the New Statesman was forecasting an attack. The pieces were being put into position. Forces were being readied. British military sources revealed then that ‘the US military switched its whole focus to Iran’ once Saddam Hussein had been deposed. As with previous operations, the label of the operation resounds with emancipative prospects: ‘Operation Iranian Freedom’. Then head of US Central Command, Admiral William ‘Fox’ Fallon, presided over plans named TIRANNT (Theatre Iran Near Term). The US presidential candidates have also made murmurings about an attack on the recalcitrant regime at stages.

In many ways, a military strike against Tehran would be a more honest appraisal of the climate between Washington, Tel Aviv and the Tehran. President Bush, for instance, has signed a secret directive authorizing covert operations against Tehran. It includes a huge geographical scope, with the possibility of assassinating key officials while supporting insurgent groups within Iran, such as the Ahwazi Arabs and Iranian Kurdish nationalists.

Washington’s key ally, Britain, has also made murmurings about preventing Tehran from getting the bomb, though it has done so with US pressure. Till now, the British stance on the matter has been dictated by the need for Iran to strike first. But Gordon Brown promised recently before the Knesset that the UK would ‘continue to lead… in our determination to prevent the Iranian nuclear weapons program.’ The window for a surgical strike may well have been left open.

Those within the Bush administration against an attack on Iran have been silenced. Grumbling about belligerence did little for Admiral Fallon. Whether he was pushed or jumped is immaterial – his views within the administration were not popular. The end result, adding to the unforeseen number of deaths, will push the barrel price of oil to staggering heights. Speculators are licking their lips.

Averting war will lead to a state of affairs that may be undesirable for Tel Aviv and Washington. A nuclear Iran will see the establishment of a regional tense balance between nuclear states. A doctrine of mutually assured destruction will come into play. While his is hardly ideal, it need not be catastrophic.

Binoy Kampmark

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Author of the article holds L.L.B., B.A and M. Phil. from the University of Queensland in Australia and Ph.D. degree from the University of Cambridge. Mr. Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, University of Cambridge. He is a member of the Australian Institute for International Affairs and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

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