RUSSIA'S AGENDA IN GEORGIA - August 16, 2008

When most Americans heard of initial reports that Russian tanks were streaming into Georgia, some at least for the moment must have wondered if Atlanta was soon to come under bombardment. But this Georgia, the one in the Caucuses that used to be part of the Soviet Union is not in the consciousness of many Americans. This Georgia is far away, with problems and "ethnic hatreds" of its own unlike those in Gone with the Wind or the cause for General Sherman's march. It is not the state that Gladys Knight is returning to in "Midnight Train to Georgia." Nonetheless, there is much to be concerned about for the globe and Americans even if it is not the Georgia Ray Charles' sings off, as the lyrics say: "Georgia, Georgia, No Peace I find."

Having frequently dealt with current Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his current United Nation's Ambassador Vitally Churkin, I'm struck that their words reveal a more extended agenda. Russia has now dramatically mutated its role from peace keeping into one of regime change, territorial rearrangement and spheres of influence. Vladimir Putin may only hold the title of Prime Minister, but more than ever he is the embodiment of a reborn imperial Russia.

AN AGENDA EXTENDING BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE CONFLICT

This latest escalation of conflict only finds the Georgians, the Ossetians, (even my spell check does not recognize Ossetia), and the Abkhaz as supporting cast in a much broader drama. I will not fall back upon stories of ancient hatreds or grievances. At least on the basis of my own diplomatic and personal experience in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia, as Bosnia & Herzegovina's Foreign Minister and United Nation's Ambassador, I found this rationalization for conflict to be too readily exploited by new would be rulers or despots. As bad, this explanation is also too frequently adopted then refashioned by appointed and self anointed mediators. After all, resolving ancient hatreds somehow projects as so much a greater chore for an outsider. On the other hand, confronting usurpers may demand a real investment of political or even military capital.

I must admit that I'm not adequately qualified to address the local political disputes. The fact that the current Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has been the subject of criticism by his own people as an absolutist, is relevant to the discussion, but only for understanding how this crisis was triggered. It is self evident that President Saakashvili overstepped by translating his words into military action to reclaim separatist territories. Besides that military recourse should be initiated only as a last and defensive resort, President Saakashvili gave a resurgent Russian imperial agenda the opportunity that was seeking the excuse. Whether President Saakashvili had received a prior green light from US foreign policy establishment for his military option to South Ossetia separatists is not evident. The US reaction was to initially define the Russian response as disproportionate, also in effect an implicit admission that Saakashvili had overstepped.

However, I cannot hope to fairly address the causes and reasons for continuation and escalation of the conflict. It is evident though that Russia no longer either perceives or is prepared to address this conflict as a peacekeeper. The Russian agenda is beyond the immediate interests and grievances and will not be constrained by such.

RECAPTURING LOST INFLUENCE, A LESSON TO SMALL AND BIG

Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov and Vitally Churkin are at the forefront of an embedded Russian leadership committed to regaining influence and potentially lost Soviet territories. They are not over the top nationalist spectacles, (such as Vladimir Zironovsky), who used to come to Bosnia & Herzegovina and fire down upon a besieged Sarajevo a few heavy caliber rounds in solidarity with their host Radovan Karadzic.

Ambassador Sergey Lavrov came in as Russia's UN representative in the early 1990's under Yeltsin's Russia still reeling from its loss of Soviet territories and influence. We frequently sparred in debates on Bosnia & Herzegovina. Although a pleasant enough person, he was combative on all points were he perceived the opportunity for Russia to regain a foothold. As Putin rose to power, Ambassador Lavrov became more confident and assertive within the UN Security Council. The US and NATO led strike in the Kosovo war though revealed a Russia not yet prepared to confront a united Euro-Atlantic alliance.

Ambassador Vitally Churkin was Russia's designated front man on Bosnia & Herzegovina and the region in the early 1990's. I first met him in August 1992 at the "London Conference" on Bosnia & Herzegovina. Despite the then recent revelations of grave violations of humanitarian law by the Pale and Belgrade Serb authorities, he was always on the political offensive on their behalf. He would frequently outflank his then boss Foreign Minister Andre Kozyrev with more demanding assertions. He was more someone who seemed to sense the value of nationalism to political ambitions than a true believer in some religious or ethnic solidarity. What Mr. Churkin then was still refining in terms of diplomatic style he compensated with his understanding of American language and culture. He never backed off, as if some gun slinger from a Western spaghetti film.

Sergei and Vitally are the ideal supporting cast, stars in their own, for Vladimir Putin's next dramatic act in remedying perceived and real grievances. Georgia seems almost the perfect stage: an aggrieved minority in a neighboring Republic in what once used to be the Soviet Union, an extension of a de-facto "Greater Russia." Their antagonist is a Georgian chief who came across as a would be Billy the Kidd, but now is forced to drop to the floor his hastily drawn revolver.

(The Georgian military chiefs had calculated that they could reach the tunnel through the mountains connecting Russia with South Ossetia. Taking preemptive positions at the South Ossetia end of the tunnel, they believed that they could hold off the superior Russian military forces, perhaps a week or so, until Moscow relented or Georgia received direct Euro-Atlantic military assistance. The Georgians miscalculated and could not reach the crucial tunnel in time or receive direct NATO support). 

Foreign Minister Lavrov has been already exploiting the scene by demanding in a phone exchange with US Secretary of State, Condi Rice, that "Saakashvili must go!" However, this not about the quick draw Georgian President or age old animosities. This is now about the re-assertive Russia and its claim to old Soviet standing.

DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND

Georgia's enthusiastically stated ambition to become a member of NATO was something that had to be stopped in the view of this new Moscow leadership. After all, Georgia is the homeland of Stalin and the soft underbelly of the restive Russian Caucuses. A formal NATO presence in Georgia could closely monitor and at least politically limit Russian maneuver in its own backyard. Russia will not accept NATO in Georgia and on its border there.

Russia's assertiveness in Georgia will also act as a clear warning to other former Soviet Republics now independent. Ukraine sees itself as both a NATO and EU candidate, but it is also the home to a significant Russian minority and, most critically, the home port of the Russian Black Sea fleet off the Crimea. NATO ambitions are not so evident in the Central Asian Republics, but such states as Kazakhstan are home to large Russian minorities and hold valuable resources. Western private investment and influence is growing in these states. Turkey, as a NATO member, an EU candidate, sharing Turkic language and Muslim religion with these evolving Central Asian Republics, is becoming an alternative to Moscow's capital, cultural influence and political sway.

Moscow is now bulging with foreign currency reserves from natural resources such as oil that have scaled up ambitions and the timetable for reassertion in what is perceived as their sphere of influence. The Bush Administration desire for a missile shield may be stalling, but it also makes Russia more impatient to draw a new line in the sand, if not the old Iron Curtain. Will there be a new Yalta as the Georgia crisis plays itself out?      

UN MANDATE OUTLINED: THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES TO THE FOREFRONT

Russia will not have its role in Georgia defined by UN mandate certainly now or probably in the future. It has made it ever clearer that it sees its role in the context of the Moscow dominated Commonwealth of Independent States., (CIS). The rhetoric from Moscow has been consistent over the last few days: The resolution to the conflict in Georgia is now the prevue of the CIS.

Russian troops have not stopped their military action, nor limited their advance to South Ossetia. Moscow ignored calls for a cease fire when the Georgians were clearly already whipped. In the first couple of days of conflict, in a CNN interview, the Russian Charge-d-Affaires in Washington gave a signal to Russia's newly evolved political position by refusing to repeat previous Moscow commitments to Georgia's territorial integrity over the "disputed" regions. Perhaps he was overly enthusiastic in asserting the sins of Georgia's initial preemptive strike into South Ossetia, but my educated guess is hat he was only more hastily moving down the list of the crucial demands outlined in his instructions and talking points from the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. He asserted that, paraphrasing: after all the atrocities committed by the Georgian strike into South Ossetia, "there should be no more talk of the disputed regions returning to Georgian sovereignty." (This fundamental negotiating stance of Moscow has now been reaffirmed in the statements of more senior Moscow officials).

THE NEW YALTA

The US and its Euro-Atlantic allies should be prepared for a long stand-off. Moscow's loss in Kosovo, whether premeditated or otherwise, will give Russia leverage in a geographic and political zone much dearer to its new ambitions. Religious or cultural affinity to Serbia and Serbs is neither a convincing nor effective argument. However, it has been deftly employed to reap much higher rewards in former Soviet states.

Serbia, Kosovo and Republika Srpska within Bosnia & Herzegovina were never part of the Soviet Union nor are they on Russia's current or the USSR's old borders. Solidarity with fellow Orthodox Christians in the Balkans has been exploited by the current crop of Moscow's foreign policy architects to establish nationalist credentials within Russia and to impress upon their Euro-Atlantic allies a new willingness to spar. Again, this may bring us to relive history: For the sake of avoiding an ever searing hot war, the globe's democracies may settle for a cold war.

Russia believes that the Euro-Atlantic alliance is divided especially about its strategy and vision of the "war on terrorism." Having placed so much of its priority and rhetoric on fighting "Islamo-Fascism," the Bush Administration is overextended and has alienated much of the rest of the globe as well as Islamic world. China has also exploited Bush Administration rhetoric on the war on terrorism to stifle free expression from Tibet to Beijing, and not just Islamic majority areas of the northwest.

In the new world order, Moscow believes it can expect to have more in common interest with China while much of the Islamic world has been shoved away from commonality with Washington and the Euro-Atlantic alliance with rhetoric of the "clash of civilizations." A few states like Serbia may have a choice to make, while others from Croatia to Macedonia, (now well on the way), to Bosnia & Herzegovina, (still playing catch-up), to Ukraine, (perceived by Moscow within their sphere), will scramble to secure themselves firmly within NATO and the Euro-Atlantic family.

Muhamed Sacirbey

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Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey holds B.A. degree in history and J. D. degree from Tulane University in New Orleans. He also holds M.B.A. degree from Columbia University. Prior to becoming Bosnia’s Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Nations, he practiced as an attorney in New York City and worked for several years as an investment banker. He presently writes his book “A Convenient Genocide, in a fishbowl ” and is a commentator on human rights and political issues.

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