POLAND, U.S. WRONG TO SUPPORT SAAKASHVILI...

OBAMA BETTER FOR CENTRAL EUROPE - October 16, 2008

The EuropeanCourier.org interviews Prof. Ryszard Zięba, Jean Monnet Chair at the Institute of International Relations of the University of Warsaw. We talk U.S. missile defense system in Central Europe, the Georgian crisis, foreign policy toward Russia and U.S. presidential elections.

EuropeanCourier.org: Will Poland’s security be enhanced by locating the U.S. missile shield on its territory?

RZ: It is said that the potential location of the U.S. antimissile interceptors in Poland, if it eventually happens, what is not yet certain because the treaty is still to be ratified by the U.S. and Poland, would cause the strengthening of the territorial defense of the U.S. against ballistic missiles launched from the rogue states, for example Iran. This argumentation is, however, not entirely convincing, because Iran does not possess such kind of missiles and won’t have them in foreseeable future. We may, therefore, conclude that the U.S. wants to protect itself from countries like Russia and China. The planned antimissile shield has no connection with the territorial defense of Poland and the Czech Republic. For that reason, Poland’s security will not be enhanced. To the contrary, the new dangers will arise from the countries opposed to the idea of the American missile shield. From a military perspective, the location of the elements of the antimissile system in Poland will alter Poland’s geopolitical position because our country will become a forefront U.S. military base.

If, hypothetically, the shield would be regarded as an obstacle by Russia, then Moscow could decide to destroy it by using overpowering number of its ballistic missiles or by conducting a surgical strike using its tactical nuclear weapons delivered by the self-steering missiles. Poland may become a target of some terrorist groups as well. In any way, Poland will become a front in a possible military confrontation; therefore will sacrifice its territory and population for the defense of the United States. Poland will become a target. As it is evidenced by the history of international military conflicts, the elements of military infrastructure like radars, airports, centers of commands, artillery, always become the first target in any war. That, for example, happened in recent war in Iraq. Poland acquiesced to become such a target and when the Polish politicians say that the missile shield will strengthen Poland’s security, they seem not to understand those implications.

EC: Does the agreement on the missile shield mean that Poland has become a significant partner for the U.S.?

RZ: Poland’s significance, after the conclusion of the agreement from August 20, is growing. Why? Because Poland has agreed to help the U.S. in a new, technologically more advanced arms race. If the U.S. base with antimissile interceptors is eventually constructed, then Poland will contribute to the strengthening of the U.S. defense. What is important is that Poland wants to sacrifice itself for its main strategic ally. It will elevate Poland’s position in the American politics. But let’s not exaggerate – it won’t be a position comparable to that of Israel in the Middle East. Zbigniew Brzezinski many times said that Poland is not a first class ally for the U.S. and won’t be. It’s a sad conclusion, which hopefully one day will be fully understood by the proponents of the missile shield in Poland, this is by the President and the Government.

The bilateral treaties with Poland and the Czech Republic are the first significant step by the U.S. toward changing of the functional strategic balance in the world. I believe, the U.S. wants to become untouchable by the missiles of current or potential enemies. If that happens, the U.S. would acquire a possibility of unrestrained operation of its constantly enhanced arsenal of offensive weapons. That would create a political possibility of unilaterally deciding about the war and peace, the fate of the whole world, in a situation where its opponents wouldn’t be able to do the same because they could not successfully attack the territory of America. The construction of the U.S. missile shield in Central Europe is a preliminary element of America’s global protection against current and future enemies. Poland and the Czech Republic are now contributing to this dangerous policy, what is being unfavorably judged by their respective populations and countries around the world, which favor peace.

EC: Will the fact of the missile shield enable Poland to play a leading political role in Central Europe? Does it cause any geopolitical change in the region?

RZ: It is hard to talk about Central Europe in a sense we talked about it several years ago. With the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the EU, only some of the cultural aspects of Central Europe remained, what was written about by Milan Kundera. Today, Poland and the majority of its neighbors, are members of both these organizations. Attempts, especially those undertaken by President Lech Kaczynski, to assume leadership in the region, are unsuccessful, if not silly. Our Central European allies do not wish to follow Poland’s leadership, but they want to work to strengthen NATO and the EU. We should do the same thing as well. We can do it even with greater determination because our country is a bigger and a stronger one. During the last Bucharest NATO Summit in April, all allies agreed that the planned location of the U.S. missile shield in Europe would mean substantial contribution to the enhancement of protection of all allies against long-range ballistic missiles, and that they have been examining the possibility of unification and implementation of the U.S. missile shield into a broader NATO antimissile infrastructure. In the next paragraph of the Bucharest Declaration there is, however, a calling to strengthen cooperation with Russia and to unify the antimissile systems of U.S., NATO and Russia. That would be a workable compromise, and it is not a secret that some European NATO members publicly oppose the American-only idea of the missile shield. They, correctly, believe that the missile shield would lead to strategic diversification of the members’ position within the Alliance, what would not strengthen the NATO, but would rather diminish its credibility as a defense organization. The Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said that the missile shield should not create a first and second class league within NATO and that the indivisibility of protection is a general principle.

As far as the European Union is concerned, there is a need to reform this organization, and a precondition of that is to ratify the Lisbon Treaty. Unfortunately, there is a paradox of lack of consequence in Poland’s policy. The President, who has been authorized by the Sejm and the Senate to ratify the Treaty, is refusing to do so, even though he was the one who negotiated it on behalf of Poland. In the meantime, he is urging the Union to speak with one voice to support Georgia and condemn Russia.

Strong, undivided NATO and the EU with active Eastern policy are in the interest of Poland. I believe that Poland, being the member of NATO and the EU, should act to strengthen both organizations. I hope we could only strengthen them not weaken. Poland should be a team player and should not try to assume leadership during political rallies (as for example the Polish President did in Georgia). NATO is the main guarantor of Poland’s security, therefore we should refrain from doing anything, what could weaken it and divide its members into league A and league B. Poland should not try to replace the NATO security factor by bilateral strategic treaties with the United States. The EU is not only an integration organization, it is a type of economic, legal and social community, which encompasses common, although not yet single, foreign and security policy. The stronger the EU, the better for us. There is no space in those both organizations to rebuild the concept of Central Europe, which disappeared. American missile shield in the region will not give back Central Europe its long gone importance; it will only divide NATO and angry Russia.

EC: In the light of recent decision by the Tusk’s government to increase military spending by 9% (approximately $1 billion) for the FY2009, should we understand that Russia’s invasion of Poland or other Baltic States is possible?

RZ: The state of Poland’s army is very bad and the announced increase in spending is limited, because of many other urgent needs. Poland tries to deal with the most urging problems in the first place, including our capability to take part in peacekeeping and stabilizing missions. The increase in military spending will not impress Russia or other countries. Russia is an empire, which has no match on the Eastern Hemisphere. Therefore comparison of Poland’s military capabilities or capabilities of other Central European countries, with Russian military capabilities makes no sense. Russia despite its bad relations with Poland and the Baltic States does not want to attack those countries. Even after Poland’s decision to install U.S. missile shield on its territory, Moscow’s Ambassador in Warsaw, Vladimir Grinin, affirmed that Russia does not wish to threaten Poland militarily. However, as it was previously announced by President Dmitri Medvedev, Russia’s reaction to the U.S. missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland will have a military character. It should be understood as a threat, possible to be realized, in a situation of a global conflict with the United States. In such situation the security of the Baltic States would suffer as well. But let’s not exaggerate, we should believe that U.S. Administration will seek compromise or at least is going to re-establish modus vivendi with Russia.

EC: What are the lessons from the Georgian crisis for Poland? What kind of foreign policy toward Russia should Poland pursue as a result?

RZ: The first lesson for Poland should be to understand that we cannot allow our ally to violate international law and at the same time condemn such violation by our enemy or opponent. Using double standards undermine credibility and efficiency of our foreign policy. Fact of the matter is that Georgia attacked the CIS peacekeeping forces (in fact Russian forces) in South Ossetia on August 7. Poland did not condemn that, but cried out when Russia responded militarily.

Second lesson is that Poland alone, or even together with Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, will not be able to accomplish much. The conflict can be successfully addressed only through a common EU’s foreign policy.

Third lesson is that the U.S. by supporting Georgia in its endeavors to combat South Ossetian separatism and to expel Russian forces from its territory behaved irresponsibly. The U.S. did nothing to peacefully solve this conflict, only the EU and the French Presidency did.

Fourth lesson, not only for Poland but also for the U.S. and other allies, is the example of Kosovo’s independence, which was recognized too early and in haste. Russia used this precedent in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Fifth lesson is that we should reconsider whether to strongly support other countries, only because they are anti-Russian. By supporting controversial Mikheil Saakashvilli, Poland dangerously exposed itself, what was done by our President Lech Kaczynski.

Sixth lesson should be the understanding for the need of urgent domestic coordination of Poland’s foreign policy. The conflict between President Kaczynski and the Tusk Administration puts Poland in bad light in the eyes of our allies and partners. The President tries to assume competencies in foreign affairs, which I believe he does not have, because the Constitution of the Republic of Poland allocates those competencies to the Council of Ministers. These political differences should be solved domestically as soon as possible because they threaten diplomatic embarrassment of Poland and can endanger our security.

After the Georgian crisis, Poland should give up on its messianic attitude toward Russia and should not go back to criticizing Russia for disproportional military reaction to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia. Russia did not lose this conflict politically. Both Russia and the European Union saved their faces.

Poland as a middle-sized country should not punch above its weight in respect to Russia, because it is an inefficient policy. We should look for a possibility of bilateral pragmatic cooperation in those fields in which it is possible to cooperate and we should opt to regulate relations with Russia in more difficult fields through the common policies of the EU and NATO. Relations with Russia are a broader topic, perhaps fit for another discussion.

EC: Which U.S. President would be better for Central Europe, Barack Obama or John McCain?

RZ: Both candidates have their advantages, which Poland and other Central European countries should appreciate. Regardless who wins the election, we should congratulate the winner and try to strengthen our bilateral relations and cooperation with the United States. The American people will make the choice, however, what is good for them, not necessarily is good for the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks or the Hungarians.

In the past decades, both, the Democrats and the Republicans, proved to be good friends of Poland and Central Europe. However, in my opinion, after the erroneous decisions of President George W. Bush in respect to war in Iraq, war in Afghanistan, the doctrine of preventive war, which is dangerous to international peace and his lack of adequate response to the financial crisis in the U.S., which has already spread globally, it would be better for Poland and Central Europe if Barack Obama was elected the next president. He promotes the notion of change, although I am not sure whether the American voters will buy it.