Karzai and Abdullah
Afghanistan and Guinea Now, From Venezuela, former Soviet States & Bosnia
When a military coup overthrew the then internationally recognized government of Guinea, the coup leaders promptly announced that all would be made OK with elections for the fall of 2009, in only 9 months. What was revealed later is that the coup leader Captain Moussa “Dadis” Camara would of course run for President in such elections. And, just to make his point, the Captain’s military opened gun fire upon demonstrators in the middle of the capital of Conakry when they rose against the prospect that the military coup leader would subvert a fair or more likely flawed election process to legitimize the initial coup as well as hold on power.
Guinea though is not the exception where elections have been held out as the cure all, only to have mixed consequences for democracy, the country and people most directly affected. Iraq and Sri Lanka are more recent elections that have yet to play out, particularly as they may preserve the rights of minorities in multi-ethnic states rather than merely confirm some notion of the dominance of the majority. From Russia, (and other former Soviet States), to Venezuela, elections have been applied as cure, balm and cosmetic with curious objectives and with frequently mixed results, at least for free and open societies, constitutional rule and democracy itself.
Mixed Blessing of Elections: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly “New & Restored Democracies”
Elections have confirmed and furthered the rule of law and democratic trends in countries with longer standing traditions of voter participation. Electorates in smaller countries with more direct voters’ links to elected officials and governance have appeared to exhibit more consistent sensibilities in the exercise of democratic tools. Comparably, larger states have more frequently faced voter apathy and the greatest commercialization of voting campaigns, as the electorate is more distant, perhaps disconnected from the levers of government. The role of professional lobbyists can come to be seen as an eroding factor in confidence in government even as it may be a necessary part of a complex process of defining legislation, laws and regulations.
Newer democracies have fared a variety of results. The United Nations has come to even incorporate a large number of self-defined states that have met on several occasions under the banner of “New and Restored Democracies.” Global conferences have been held from Mongolia to Nicaragua, in which I participated. This grouping even has acted as a more united block within various UN institutions. However, the evolution of democracy has varied substantively in these states, some exceeding the quality of more established democracies while others at best are dubious in deserving the designation.
After the Collapse of the Iron Curtain
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia are good examples of democracy rapidly evolving to meet the criteria of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, as the EU and NATO, to which such new and/or restored democracies aspired. Membership in the Council of Europe and adherence to its conventions has encompassed a broader array of states. Adherence to the Council’s Convention(s) though has been spottier, including in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Most of these states have experienced a calibration in the newly liberated and empowered electorate. Some countries have experienced broad swings, from nationalism to nostalgia for economic certainty and security perceived to be linked to previous authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, elections have more quickly become associated with not only the furtherance of constitutional democracy but also the rule of law and free and open societies.
The distinguishing factor between countries more or less successful in the transition in the former Soviet States and communist countries, (including the former Yugoslavia), is not so much cultural or even historic as aspirational linked to Euro-Atlantic inclusion. While some observers have opted for stereotypes to explain the wide differences in progress, such are more self-serving rationalizations rather than legitimate evaluations. Democracy, the rule of law and open societies have flourished best where high standards and expectations were established and the electorate anticipated the fruits of such. This best explains the difference between former Soviet/communist states that are integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions versus those that are still trying to identify their new broader belonging. (All of these societies may still share some negative inclinations including hyper-nationalism and bigotry, as toward the Roma).
However, elections have not been the distinguishing factor in and of themselves. While in some Euro-Atlantic bound states the election process has served to help secure a new path, in other such states the veneer of elections has been co-opted to perpetuate the old dominances. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, elections have come to entrench ethnic delineation institutionalized into the political and even constitutional system, (under the so-termed Dayton Accords Constitution). Dominance over another based upon ethnicity or religion is legitimized and people are primarily defined by belonging to an ethnic or religious group. (Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims, and Croats are placed into inferior status in Republika Srpska while Jews, Roma and the “others” appear not to be equal anywhere, except by the munificence of one of the dominant groups within its own designated geographic and constitutional sphere.
Elections: Pro & Con
Elections have their essential role in the service of free, democratic and open societies. Of course, elections may have broader agendas in consideration emanating from within and outside the voters’ constituency:
• Elections provide fundamental legitimacy to representative government and the exercise of executive authority. Governments are empowered by the action of their constituency, particularly voting. (This is applicable to some constitutional monarchies as republics). Progressive values and the functionality government are all furthered.
• More recently, elections have been employed to legitimize outside actors who have intervened, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq. The United Nations, OSCE and other multilateral institutions, as well as prominent individuals, have come as passive or even proactive observers to provide assurances of fairness and further legitimacy.
• Finally, elections within the intervened state may become part of an exhibit or even campaign in the state(s) from which the intervention emanates. South Africans of all colors, arriving at voting booths validated the political and economic pressure ultimately pressed against the Apartheid regime. Iraqi’s, vanquished or liberated, queuing to vote continued to provide political fuel to policies of the George W. Bush Administration in its options in Iraq, (besides whatever other benefits or deficits that the elections provided for Iraqis). Elections in Iraq or Afghanistan are understood to have effected voting in the US and European powers.
Bosnia Elections September 1996 & US Elections November 1996
Elections in BiH could have been a progressive, perhaps even healing step after years of conflict. They could have re-empowered citizens, especially in those areas where the might of ethnic cleansing had denied displaced persons and refugees their fundamental rights as citizens to their home and security. In preparing for the vote, the conditions for “free and fair” would have to be established. Perhaps this would have been the most urgent and enduring benefit of elections in post-war BiH, and especially in the ethnically cleansed segments of the country.
Perhaps the progressive consequences of timely elections in BiH would have been realized, except for the curious timing. Richard Holbrooke persisted that elections should be scheduled for September 1996, only 9 months after the Dayton talks. It was a far too short of time to insure that conditions existed for “free and fair” elections, but if the US and international community were stimulated to accelerate normalization processes, particularly the return of voters such as refugees and displaced persons to the home from where they were expelled, some in the BiH delegation believed this a risk worth taking.
Unfortunately though little was accomplished in securing the conditions for “free and fair elections” as called for by the Dayton Accords and international standards. While some only were interested in the cosmetics of BiH elections, others as then High Representative Carl Bildt took actions immediately after Dayton that further promoted division rather than return and reintegration. Already in the spring of 1996 I alerted privately and through the media that the environment for “free and fair elections” was not being promoted, but perhaps to the contrary. (See my interview on the “Charlie Rose Show” ).
Holbrooke’s persistence for September 1996 as it turns out had little to do with BiH’s best interests. The calculation was that if he could “exhibit” show elections in BiH in September then he could claim to then President Bill Clinton, running for reelection, that he had helped him secure the US presidential race over Senator Bob Dole. (Keep in mind that Dole had been vocal in calling for greater NATO activism in confronting Milosevic’s Serbia or at least assisting the Government of BiH and lifting the arms embargo). Whether Bill Clinton actually believed that the image of BiH elections would materially impact his own reelection was somewhat moot to Holbrooke. It was important to him that he would be able to march into Clinton’s office and claim that Bill owed him and thus would be obliged to appoint him as the new Secretary of State to replace the departing Warren Christopher. After all, Bosnia had been Clinton’s most visible foreign policy headache.
In his pursuit of this goal, with perhaps the additional promotional value of what he believed was a real possibility of a Nobel Peace Prize and film and book deals, Holbrooke was relentless. The substance in BiH did not matter and the reality of whether conditions in BiH existed for “free and fair elections” was only problematic to the extent it would expose the fundamental failure of Holbrooke’s Dayton in securing the return of refugees and normalcy.
Perception was managed and obstacles either shoved aside or redefined to no longer be seen as problematic. An indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic was convinced, with the “non-arrest deal,” to abandon his political candidacy so to remove the potential stain that such would project on Holbrooke’s election show. When independent international observers noted that the conditions had not been met for the “free and fair elections” envisioned, Holbrooke strong-armed them into nonetheless certifying the process. He even carried ballots from the US, rightfully or not cast, which would be decisive in the perception of the election results delivered.
Elections in BiH had become a subplot to US elections and more, to personal ambitions for Washington office. No matter that it really did not carry that much weight to Bill Clinton’s reelection and that Richard Holbrooke ultimately was not able to claim the US Secretary of State’s title, one for which he still yearns.
Again in Afghanistan
The last cycle of elections, or perhaps non-elections, in Afghanistan has left a sour taste, not to mention potentially damaging consequences for the reputation of democracy in a country just now trying to embrace the values of such. Voting has been used as a blunt tool for control while little care was given to establishing the preconditions for “free and fair.”
More to the point, whether these elections were seen as promoting democracy, the objective of furthering a more free and open society appears to have been set aside. In fact, the appearance of elections became more important to the international factors in Afghanistan than the harm inflicted upon democratic values and principles of free and open societies.
Whether President Hamid Karzai really won the vote has almost become irrelevant. The image of him and his presidency has critically suffered by the various internationally managed improvisations to the election process. (Efforts to broker a “backroom Deal” for a coalition with Karazai’s chief opponent, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah only degraded the value of democratic results). Of course, countless Afghans and international soldiers risked their lives to project the success of elections that in the end where not. Many died for the photo opportunity.
The fact that Richard Holbrooke is President Obama’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, (and Pakistan), is more coincidence, perhaps. Nonetheless, it is possibly indicative of the casual affair with true democracy and devotion to the appearance, cosmetics of elections.
The elections fix is not free, either in lives committed, principles engaged or the reputation of us promoting free, democratic and open societies. Elections demand integrity in substance beyond the appearance desired.
