- Muhamed Sacirbey
Should Bosnia Reconsider its Troop Deployment to NATO Coalition in Afghanistan If Bosnia & Herzegovina is not offered NATO Membership Action Plan, (MAP)?
Bosnia & Herzegovina (”BiH”) has offered a substantial military commitment of troops to the NATO coalition effort in Afghanistan. However, just as BiH is readying the deployment, the US State Department and some EU member states have now effectively blocked BiH’s road toward NATO accession, the Membership Action Plan, (or “MAP”). It is much more than BiH again being left waiting at the altar. BiH is being denied MAP for reasons that have little to do with the capacity or other considerations related to its military. To the contrary, BiH’s ability to contribute to NATO and UN military efforts is more highly considered. Rather, it appears that some in Washington, Brussels and EU capitals believe this a way to press Bosniaks, (”Bosnian Muslims”), to make further concessions in negotiations regarding BiH’s constitutional framework. Apparently the logic is that since Bosnian Serbs may not be as enthused regarding NATO membership,(presumably due to their greater affinity for Moscow), this prospect should then be used as leverage to prompt those that are most inclined toward NATO, the BiH Croats and Bosniaks.
Perverted & Counterproductive Exclusion
This logic is as counterproductive for BiH as it is self defeating for NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Further, it shows that when BiH is concerned, particularly the Bosniaks, they are treated as much less the potential partners and more with the disrespect of patsies. By comparison, Montenegro, newly separated from Serbia, part of the federation that attacked BiH back in 1992 and majority Orthodox Serb, has been offered NATO’s MAP although it is not committing troops to the NATO effort and objectively is not as well versed in NATO doctrine. Don’t misunderstand: I’m all for NATO also bringing Montenegro, (and for that matter Serbia), into the alliance, but why is it that BiH constantly suffers from a moving bar generally kept out of its reach despite the fact the BiH Army is one of the most functionally and operationally capable and trained in NATO methodology?
Bosnian & Herzegovinian citizens are now constantly lectured that their status as victims from the war and genocide 15 years earlier does not count for much either politically or in practical application of judicial decisions, (despite legal rulings from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “ICTY”, and the International Court of Justice, “ICJ”). Bosniaks are told, effectively scolded, to forget their victimization, in the least because it carries neither real sympathy nor consequences for the future. However, when it comes to confronting the radicalized Taliban and/or Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan or perhaps some future operational theater, the Bosniaks historical status as “European Muslims,” as victims and survivors of a genocide directed at them, makes BiH a critical ally well beyond the sheer numbers of the country’s potential contribution to the NATO military effort. Ironically, when it comes to benefit BiH or Bosniaks themselves, BiH’s victimization and genocide inflicted upon its Muslim peoples, they are told it does not count for much. However, it does carry weight when western democracies need “Muslims” along their side fighting other Muslims.
Some Western political leaders, including Richard Holbrooke, also tout that they intervened in BiH to save Muslims from slaughter. Again, though, that is neither the complete story of what and why it happened nor does it define the current reality.
A Capable Military
Do not mistake though: BiH’s army and capacity is more than mere symbolism. BiH has already provided troops to the coalition effort in Iraq, primarily in de-mining and munitions removal, and has participated in peacekeeping efforts in other hot spots, including the Horn of Africa. The more than 100 that would be deployed to Afghanistan would be part of a combat unit.
BiH Army, Singular Success for Reason
The BiH Army is one of the few successful institutions under the authority of the central government rather than the two “entities” by which the country is now effectively separated. Serbs, Croats, “Others” as well as Bosniaks make up the army, and they have effectively served within integrated units in several peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.
The relative success is not the result of accident. Whatever bitterness and opposing views of history may be left in the hearts and minds of some individuals, they are overcome in their professionalism as soldiers and as a unit. During the Dayton talks, we insisted that the military not be under the authority of the two entities but rather under the civilian command of BiH’s central government, the joint presidency, (even if reporting to each of the three separately at first). During Dayton, we also insisted upon a “Train & Equip” program to help prepare BiH’s military for NATO affiliation/partnership as well as to help deter history from repeating itself and another attack and possible genocide being launched against the country and its citizens.
The Train & Equip program eventually encompassed and helped transform the armies of all “three sides” into a cohesive unit. However, initially Train & Equip met with opposition from some in the US State Department and many EU capitals. Perhaps without the stalwart support across the US political spectrum, from Senator Joe Biden to Senator Bob Dole to Richard Perle, (who acted as informal adviser on matters during and after Dayton).
The opposition was not based on funding considerations. (In conjunction with President Bill Clinton’s Special Envoy, Mac McLarty, we successfully solicited funds from wealthier “Islamic states” and Turkey). Some EU and State Department officials again used the stale argument that adding more weapons to BiH would be adding potential fuel to a simmering situation. Some proposed a demilitarized BiH. That might have been fine, if BiH would be encompassed under a NATO security umbrella and be admitted as a NATO partner without being a NATO military contributor. Of course, this option was not offered to BiH. Further, BiH’s neighbors were not proposed to be disarmed, and after all it was BiH that was invaded and not the other way around. BiH had learned painfully, and its citizens knew that they could not rely upon vague third country assurances regarding security. At the outset of the conflict having to defend itself without a standing army, BiH’s initially improvised military defense was transformed into the national defense force which was decisive in saving the country from being destroyed, in deterring the ethnic cleansing of its citizens and prompting the opportunity for peace. (Many would now claim the credit for peace in BiH including some political leaders of western democracies; however, it was the BiH Army which overcame the odds and expectations of those who were just standing at the sidelines waiting for BiH’s demise and the expulsion/murder of most of its “Muslim” and Croat populations. Only after this unexpected “standoff,” then did western democracies intervene decisively and at the moment the BiH Army had the momentum. During the war, while most of BiH’S enlisted men and officers were Bosniak, mostly volunteers defending homes and family, many were also Croats, Serbs and others fighting alongside to save BiH as a sovereign state and a multi-ethnic society. This reached all the way into the top command with General Divjak and Colonel Siber representing BiH’s Serbs and Croats who defended BiH).
When There is Will, There is Way toward Reintegration
The Train & Equip program was administered financially and implemented on the ground under US guidance with some other NATO members, most notably Turkey also providing training. From what some believed was a “forced marriage” or “adding new fuel” has turned out in hindsight to be one of the few success in helping BiH reintegrate, move to be a more functional state and and now contribute to other areas in global security rather than to be just a passive consumer. Understandably, all Bosnians/Herzegovinians, from both entities are deserving to be proud of and credit for this transformation. It is also one that has reduced rather than raised the potential for conflict within BiH.
So why is this precedent and positive momentum not being furthered? Almost from the outset, some tried to employ BiH membership in NATO as leverage, frequently on some unrelated negotiating ploy with fleeting if any value. President Bill Clinton, prompted by my persistent request, reiterated after Dayton that BiH’s accession toward NATO’s Partnership for Peace and eventual full partnership would be accelerated. (Several EU Parliamentarians also prodded for accelerated BiH integration into EU as a situation requiring special treatment for benefit of BiH but also overall stability within Europe). Repeatedly though this goal(s) has been frustrated by those who have been representing Washington and/or some EU states in the view that NATO (EU) membership should be held out as carrot or stick.
On the Front Line, In the Back Room!
It should not surprise when some Bosnians & Herzegovinians observe: “When it comes to us as Muslims killing other Muslims, they want us on the front line, but when it comes to sitting at the same table, we are told to wait outside the room, outside the house!”
This is not just a perception of NATO’s attitude but also the EU. While Serbia as well most of the other states of the region are already on the road to EU accession, BiH is sidelined. Serbia, despite still not having delivered Ratko Mladic and a couple of other “big fish” indicted war criminal to the ICTY, has been offered favored visa treatment while BiH continues to be denied. Bosniaks see this most directed at them, since Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats would be eligible for the favored visa regime through dual citizenship and the Serbian
or Croatian state passports that they would or already do hold.
Inclusion or Exclusion
Why should Bosniaks not be both suspicious and disheartened by the double standards and treatment especially in view of the current example of open hostility expressed toward Turkey’s EU candidacy because of its Muslim population and identity. Bosniaks are not Turks but mainly of Slavic, European pedigree; however it should not surprise that after the last two decades of treatment and several pogroms over the previous two centuries, many have come to believe, (frankly including me), what seems to count, now and in the past, in the eyes of European leadership on matters of inclusion or exclusion has been religious identity.
Criteria has been arbitrarily applied or perhaps not: Key conditionality for Serbia’s EU accession, as noted above, has now largely been set aside, championed by such politicos as Carl Bildt whose motives can only be viewed with suspicion. Despite its recent history and continued obstinacy, Serbia has its many champions in Washington and EU capitals. (Only the Netherlands has stood fast to conditionality still prodded by its first hand view of the Srebrenica genocide).
Punked!
On the other hand, BiH’s own advance toward Partnership for Peace and full NATO partnership was incredibly blocked due to Republika Srpska’s presumed failure to deliver indicted war criminals. The irony was that Bosniaks were most adversely affected as it was Serbia’s failure to deliver war criminals like Ratko Mladic indicted for crimes against “Bosnian Muslims” that was keeping BiH from moving toward inclusion. This perverted logic at times does appear haphazard at best, but BiH citizens are right to ask: “if Belgrade has its champions in EU capitals and Washington despite its recent past and obstinacy, where are the champions for BiH, particularly the Bosniaks?” (Again, we should emphasize this is not to advocate Serbia’s exclusion but to question the lack of will and action for BiH’s similar inclusion).
The expectation was that at least Washington would be there to promote BiH’s case, or at least prevent presumably unintended negative applications for BiH. However, at least the State Department has been as likely to perpetuate the mistakes rather than risk upsetting the prevailing tide. (If the country’s current “Dayton structure” is responsible for BiH’s broader failures in governance and functionality, it is Washington and EU that carry paramount responsibility for first effectively imposing a flawed and then implementing the least progressive definition of the Dayton Accords).
Options?
Most BiH citizens are rightfully of the view that the best option for BiH is NATO partnership, but what if ignorance and prejudice keeps the door closed? What options does BiH have?
BiH’s political leadership has not been particularly active in reviewing, identifying and evaluating alternatives to either NATO or EU membership. Perhaps most believe it is all inevitable, but BiH risks the fate of a common law wife where common law has no practical consequence, except disrespect and being taken for granted, perhaps exploited indefinitely.
NATO, and for that matter the EU, cannot indefinitely count upon the success of co opting BiH political leaders, whether through intimidation or self interest. Ultimately, the evolution of the BiH/NATO relationship will be driven by mutually consistent strategic interests. BiH’s citizens will, eventually, hold their leadership accountable to move BiH into NATO and the EU now or to identify, evaluate and perhaps pursue alternatives.
Alternatives
What are BiH’s alternatives to NATO and the EU?
Again, they cannot be readily recognized nor evaluated without being seriously identified and reviewed, and such will have to take into consideration the interests and inclinations of all of its citizens, Croats, Serbs, “Others” and Bosniaks:
— Switzerland has evolved, admittedly over a prolonged period, as a militarily “neutral” state, with an effective defense force. By choice, it is also not an EU candidate. (Austria, Lichtenstein, Sweden, Ireland, Finland are only some other examples of European states that have managed to realize their interests without membership in NATO and/or the EU. Most have opted for bilateral arrangement with such institutions and/or member states while opting to stay outside).
— BiH, like many of the other states, has become an active and effective contributor to UN peacekeeping. BiH’s current election to the UN Security Council will only enhance this role.
— Concerned by BiH’s slide into vaguery, Turkey and Croatia have teamed up again with BiH to evaluate options for the more immediate issues to prompt BiH’s progressive constitutional and institutional evolution. In this framework, the window is also now more open to see longer term regional alternatives.
— Turkey is a NATO partner, but can expect continued obfuscation to its EU aspirations. Turkey is no longer so preoccupied with the rejection. Rather, it is emphasizing those opportunities that are open in order to optimize its growing economic and political influence.
— Serbia, (Belgrade), and Serbs as a people may be more inclined to see their lot closer to Moscow’s broader influence. Bosniaks will recall that after Orthodox Christianity, (which is shared by Serbs and most Russians), Muslims are the second largest group by religious identity, Slavic and Turkic.
— BiH, particularly its Muslim population, is perceived in a unique perspective by the Islamic world as a whole. Bosniaks are already influentially contributing to the economic and cultural life in many rapidly developing states. Whether through the OIC, (Organization of the Islamic Conference, has as members and observers several non-Muslim majority states), BiH should regardless look to exploit for mutual benefit the unique status of meeting ground and perhaps marketplace between East and West.
— Having shared common political borders in the former Yugoslavia with Croatia, Serbia, but also Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, (and Kosovo), BiH at this epicenter has more in common and less divisive with most of its neighbors.
First Option
Well, I did not say that there was a clear cut alternative to either NATO or the EU, not perhaps even readily recognizable options! However, BiH has no alternative but to start to identify and evaluate alternatives, if for no other reason than be able to play hard to get and maintain its dignity and the respect of its would be partners. It cannot afford to be seen as the old maid of the region, of Europe nor does it deserve such a fate in view of its natural beauty, cultural personality and historical soul, (Bosniak, Orthodox, Catholic and Jewish).
Perhaps then, BiH will actually gain the benefit of alternatives and/or its potential partners will come to truly recognize and appreciate with deeds BiH’s potential as partner:
— BiH has proven capacity to contribute operationally.
— BiH’s role as Muslim majority country has both symbolic and functional advantages in the key theaters where minds, hearts and ideological battles must be won for democracy and open societies.
— The rapid integration of states as Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary to Bulgaria has evidenced how NATO membership can benefit old and new members with political, security and economic stability, (and also prompt EU integration). Between Greece and Turkey, membership for both has been perhaps the difference between war and this extended co-existence.
— BiH membership in NATO would be a positive catalyst for Serbia’s strategic cooperation with NATO or perhaps eventual integration.
BiH will not be admitted to NATO or brought closer to EU inclusion by pleading. BiH must review or reconsider its Afghanistan contribution to the extent that such is not recognized as being in the context of a partner and of mutually consistent interests. BiH cannot be left standing at the altar, for real or imagined shortcomings in its appearance. Substantively, BiH is a desirable partner to those that will embrace its future. BiH will best serve its future by demanding respect for its unique assets and to be treated respectfully and consistently, and, until it is brought into full partnership within NATO, by doing what every mature state must do: identify and know its alternatives even if they may not be optimal or its first love.
